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• The Bank of Canada hoped to meet four key
objectives when it introduced a new system for
announcing its decisions regarding the target for
the overnight rate of interest in late 2000. These
included reduced uncertainty in financial markets,
greater focus on the Canadian rather than the
U.S. economic environment, more emphasis on
the medium-term perspective of monetary policy,
and increased transparency regarding the Bank’s
interest rate decisions.
• Evidence to date suggests that all four objectives
have been met to a substantial degree. Uncertainty
has been reduced, and markets now pay more
attention to Canadian economic data. Market
participants and the media show greater aware-
ness of the medium-term perspective in which
policy decisions are taken, and the reasons for
the decisions are more transparent.
• Fixed announcement dates have provided regular
opportunities for the Bank to communicate its
views on the state of the Canadian economy to the
public. This has helped to improve the ﬁnancial
markets’ understanding of the broad direction of
monetary policy and generally to increase public
understanding of the rationale behind the Bank’s
policy decisions, although the decisions them-
selves are not always fully anticipated.
n December2000,theBankofCanadaintroduceda
new system of eight “ﬁxed” or pre-specifieddates
each year for announcing decisions on its key pol-
icy interest rate, the target for the overnight rate.
After considerable analysis, the Bank had concluded
that this system of fixed announcement dates (FADS)
would lead to more effective implementation of mone-
tary policy. The new arrangement was launched with
four key objectives in mind: reduced uncertainty in
financial markets; enhanced focus on the Canadian
economic context; greater emphasis on the medium-
term perspective of monetary policy; and increased
transparency, accountability, and dialogue with the
public. In this article, we examine the objectives and
results of the ﬁxed-date strategy to this point, basing
our assessment on empirical evidence; monitoring
and analysis of media coverage; and feedback from
the media, ﬁnancial analysts, and regional contacts.
Background
Before November 2000, Bank practice was to announce
changes to the target for the overnight rate at 9 a.m on
any business day. Sometimes these announcements
followed closely on the heels of interest rate decisions
by the U.S. Federal Reserve, leading Canadian money
markets to be extremely sensitive to macroeconomic
developments in the United States compared with
those in Canada. Between February 1996 and October
2000, for example, seven of the Fed’s ten interest
rate changes were immediately followed by similar
decisions by the Bank of Canada, giving the impres-
sion that the Bank was simply taking its cue from the
Fed’s decisions (Aba 2001). This perception prevailed
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despite the fact that the Bank changed its policy rate
25 times in total during this period. 1
Further to this tendency to confuse the Bank of Canada’s
decision-making process with that of the Fed, there
were relatively few scheduled opportunities for com-
munication during the year. This limited the number
of occasions when the Bank could update the public
on its policy thinking (Vayid 2002). As well, since
there were no ﬁxed dates for decisions, there were
fewer occasions to achieve internal consensus on what
the Bank would say publicly. One result of this approach
was that, from time to time, the Bank was criticized by
the media and the markets for perceived missteps in
its public communications. The Financial Post reported
in September 1997, for example, that “the Bank of
Canada’s credibility is coming under intense scrutiny. . .
[Governor] Thiessen now runs the risk of being seen
as ‘crying wolf’ if he does not raise rates.” And, “Of
course, the central bank cannot telegraph its intentions
in the markets. But Thiessen, though his desire to
communicate is admirable, should be more careful not
to keep stoking expectations.”
Towards the end of 2000, the Bank addressed these
issues by adopting a ﬁxed schedule for announcing
interest rate decisions (Thiessen 2000).2 Henceforth,
decisions would be announced on eight pre-set dates
every year, at 9 a.m., always accompanied by a press
release explaining the reasons behind the decision. In
the event of extraordinary circumstances, the Bank
reserved the right to make announcements outside the
schedule.
Before embarking on the new system, the Bank con-
ducted a series of consultations with ﬁnancial markets
and the public. The results showed general support
for ﬁxed dates, with a preference for Tuesdays so as
not to interfere with the Wednesday bond auctions.
Respondents also wanted to stay with the 9 a.m. time,
believing that this would ensure consistency with the
Bank’s past practice.
After working with this system for the past two and a
half years it is time to ask if the Bank has met its objec-
tives for ﬁxed announcement dates.
1.  In fact, in the year before ﬁxed dates were adopted, the Bank matched all
the decisions taken by the Fed, which reinforced the perception that the Bank
was simply following the Fed.
2.  This action was taken in a context in which ﬁxed announcement dates
were increasingly viewed as the international norm. The Bank of England, the
Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank had recently adopted some
form of ﬁxed-date system.
Reduced Uncertainty
in Financial Markets
The ﬁrst objective in adopting ﬁxed announcement
dates was to reduce uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets
regarding the timing of policy announcements. This
represented an important development for market
participants, since the overnight rate is the Bank’s key
policy instrument for inﬂuencing short-term interest
rates and other asset prices. When the Bank changes
the target for the overnight rate, the change usually
affects other interest rates, including mortgage rates
and primerates charged bycommercial banks. Knowing
that the Bank would only make changes on speciﬁc
announcement dates would allow participants to plan
ahead without wondering daily whether the Bank
would change its target for the overnight rate.
Empirical evidence discussed in this section shows
that the reduced uncertainty as to the timing of future
decisions by the Bank has improved the pricing efﬁ-
ciency of Canadian money markets. It also appears
that making interest rate announcements on ﬁxed
dates may have contributed to the development of
new ﬁnancial instruments.
Empirical evidence . . . shows that the
reduced uncertainty as to the timing
of future decisions by the Bank has
improved the pricing efﬁciency of
Canadian money markets.
One concern expressed by some respondents during
the consultation period in the autumn of 2000 was
whether volatility in foreign exchange and debt markets
might ensue if the Bank’s announcement date was set
too far apart from the Fed’s. The Bank believed, how-
ever, that once the calendar was established, market
players would make the necessary adjustments so that
markets would not experience a rise in volatility. The
Bank also believed that a reasonable interval is neces-
sary to permit more attention to be focused on Cana-
dian economic fundamentals and circumstances in the
period leading up to, and following, the Bank’s inter-
est rate announcements. In the event, markets have
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announcements from the Fed into their expectations
for actions by the Bank of Canada, just as they would
for any other relevant news.
Eliminating the 9 a.m. watch
One consequence of adopting ﬁxed announcement
dates was the elimination of the so-called “9 a.m.
watch.” On mornings when the announcement of a
change to the overnight rate was thought to be partic-
ularly likely, trading slowed to a snail’s pace because
currency and bond traders tended to avoid trading
until after 9 a.m. The low level of liquidity noted in
markets on those mornings was problematic for mar-
ket participants, since prices were less representative,
and it was harder to conduct business at low cost. By
adopting the ﬁxed-date approach, the Bank has elimi-
nated the 9 a.m. watch (except on announcement
days), so that markets now work more efﬁciently
around that time.
Impact on money market instruments
The decrease in uncertainty has made it easier to price
ﬁnancial instruments with short terms to maturity
(less than one year), since they are closely linked to the
Bank’s target overnight rate. Johnson (2003) examined
the impact of the new system on the very short end of
the term structure (the “money market”) by testing
the expectations hypothesis before and after the
implementation of ﬁxed announcement dates. His
results suggest that the prices observed in ﬁnancial
markets have become more consistent with theoretical
models that attempt to explain how interest rates
should move in relation to each other. The expectations
hypothesis now appears to be a reasonably accurate
representation of the mechanics of the short end of the
Canadian yield curve. One explanation for this change
suggested by Johnson is that the ﬁxed announcement
dates have helped to reduce errors related to expecta-
tions in the pricing of short-term assets.
While the new system is not the only reason for the
reduced volatility of interest rates, Johnson shows that
the observed change dovetails with its adoption. This
represents an important development in Canadian
ﬁnancial markets, since reduced expectational errors
in pricing money market assets is likely to improve
market efficiency. Moreover, it is now possible to derive
ﬁnancial expectations for future policy moves with
greater conﬁdence.3
3.  Financial market expectations represent one element of the information
that the Governing Council monitors when making its decision.
Development of new ﬁnancial instruments
Because of the reduced uncertainty surrounding
short-term interest rates associated with ﬁxed
announcement dates, market participants seem to
have greater conﬁdence in the prices of certain instru-
ments. This increased conﬁdence has been associated
with a rapid increase in the volume of the Overnight
Indexed Swap market (OIS) and the development of
the ONX contract on the Montreal Exchange. The OIS
is a ﬁxed/ﬂoating swap in which the ﬂoating rate is
tied to a daily overnight reference rate. The ONX is an
exchange-traded version of the OIS.
The OIS contract was introduced in March 1999; anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that the adoption of the ﬁxed-
date approach by the Bank in 2000 added to the popu-
larity of this product. The higher volume of trading in
this instrument has improved its reliability for meas-
uring interest rate expectations.
Enhanced Focus on the Canadian
Economy
The second objective of the new system was to focus
the attention of market participants and the general
public on economic and financial conditions in Canada.
In addition to empirical evidence presented below,
analysis of media coverage suggests that when financial
markets and the media are forming their views of policy
interest rate decisions, they now pay more attention to
the economic environment in Canada, especially in
the periods just prior to and following interest rate
announcements.
Analysis of media coverage suggests
that when ﬁnancial markets and the
media are forming their views of
policy interest rate decisions, they
now pay more attention to the
economic environment in Canada.
Over the two-year period before the introduction of
ﬁxed dates, monetary policies in Canada and the
United States were strongly correlated, owing to the
convergence in the business cycles of the two coun-
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for the two countries to adopt a similar policy stance,
the Bank was concerned during this period that ﬁnan-
cial markets and the general public were perceiving
Canadian monetary policy as being overly inﬂuenced
by that of the United States. As well, market partici-
pants and others tended to focus principally on U.S.
economic developments. This situation presented
problems, as the Bank and the markets were focusing
on different information. In that context, markets
could be surprised more often by decisions taken by
the Bank and may have questioned the rationale
behind those decisions, giving rise to communication
challenges for the Bank.
Parent (2002–2003) examined whether the introduction
of ﬁxed announcement dates has increased the focus
of market participants on Canadian macroeconomic
data, using tests based on the theory of efﬁcient mar-
kets, which predict that the prices of ﬁnancial instru-
ments will always reﬂect available information. Thus,
when markets are efﬁcient, short-term interest rates
should adjust almost instantaneously after the release
of data that modify ﬁnancial market expectations of
monetary policy. He found that Canadian data did not
have a signiﬁcant impact on short-term interest rates
before the implementation of the new system.4 Indeed,
only U.S. macroeconomic data had a significant impact
on Canadian rates between 1996 and 2000. More
speciﬁcally, U.S. economic factors, including indus-
4.   At the 1 per cent level, no coefﬁcient associated with Canadian announce-


















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
trial production, the ISM index,5 non-farm payrolls,
and retail sales were found to have an impact on both
the BAX 3-month futures contract, which is based on a
Canadian banker’s acceptance (BA), and the two-year
interest rates.
Results obtained from the period following the adoption
of ﬁxed announcement dates suggest that Canadian
macroeconomic data now have a significant impact
on both BAX and two-year interest rates. Canadian
employment numbers and Canadian retail sales now
seem to be the variables that affect BAX contracts. U.S.
macroeconomic indicators are no longer statistically
signiﬁcant, indicating that market participants focus
less on developments south of the border and more on
Canadian data.6
The ﬁxed-date regime may not be the only cause,
however. An alternative explanation is that the recent
divergence in economic performance between Canada
and the United States may have encouraged market
participants to focus more on Canadian economic con-
ditions. Recent differences in the economic growth
and inﬂation proﬁles between Canada and the United
States have underscored the importance of focusing
on the “made in Canada” factors along with interna-
tional developments affecting the broad stance of
monetary policy. For example, with ﬁnancial markets
paying more attention to Canadian data, the decision
to raise rates in the ﬁrst half of 2002, while the Fed was
still in an easing mode, did not come as a surprise.
In terms of media reaction, the enhanced focus on the
Canadian economy appears to have been largely suc-
cessful in the periods immediately preceding and fol-
lowing each ﬁxed announcement date. There is
extensive media commentary in anticipation of the
Bank’s decision, including regular polling of private
sector economists by a number of wire services, and
post-FAD analysis by media, markets, and interna-
tional observers. This coverage has raised the proﬁle
of Canadian monetary policy and has contributed to
greater awareness of Canadian economic issues.
5.  The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) index, formerly the National
Association for Purchasing Management (NAPM), is based on a national sur-
vey of manufacturing activity.
6.  The regressions have been re-estimated with data up to February 2003. In
the regression using BAX as the dependent variable, these two variables are
signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. When the dependent variable is the two-
year interest rate, only Canadian retail sales and U.S. industrial production
are statistically signiﬁcant.7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
Canadian macroeconomic data now
have a signiﬁcant impact on both
BAX and two-year interest rates.
Regular analysis of media coverage undertaken by the
Bank suggests that, by and large, the key monetary
policy messages are being captured and communicated
to financial market participants and through the media
to the general public. It is also clear that the media
now draw a distinction between Canadian and U.S.
economic conditions. For example, writing in the The
Globe and Mail, Bruce Little (2002) noted that “our
economy has followed a different path than that of the
United States. There, Fed chairman Alan Greenspan
has sounded enough cautionary notes that some ana-
lysts think he won’t begin raising rates until as late as
August,bywhichtimetheBankofCanadawillprobably
have notched up another two increases.” He went on to
note that “what happens in the U.S. affects Canada, but
Canada’s economy is not a clone of the U.S. economy.”
In a similar vein, Joel Baglole of The Wall Street Journal
(2002) wrote, “Mr. Dodge has steered an independent
course from the U.S. Federal Reserve, blunting argu-
ments by skeptics who say the central bank has little




The third objective was to increase the emphasis on
the forward-looking nature of monetary policy. It was
hoped that this would increase awareness among the
general public and ﬁnancial market participants that it
takes a period of 18 to 24 months for monetary policy
actions to have their full impact on the economy and
inﬂation. The system of ﬁxed announcement dates has
helped to reinforce this medium-term perspective by
providing a regular opportunity for the Bank to relate
recent economic and ﬁnancial developments to the
underlying trends over a longer period.
Although there has been some success in this regard,
this objective still poses a signiﬁcant challenge, as both
the markets and the media are typically focused on
the immediate future. Evidence of some movement
towards a longer-term perspective was provided by
The Globe and Mail’s Bruce Little (2002), who wrote,
“Timely means moving soon enough to prevent inﬂa-
tion from breaching the Bank’s 2 per cent target.
Because it takes ﬁve to seven quarters for rate changes
to affect inﬂation, and since the Bank ﬁgures inﬂation
will be at 2 per cent at the end of next year, the Bank
has to begin moving its rate now, regardless of what
the U.S. Federal Reserve Board has in mind.”
While the Bank makes every effort to
be ﬂexible in its communications, an
inherent tension remains between the
short-term perspective of the media
and the ﬁnancial markets and the
longer-term objective of monetary
policy.
This nascent recognition of a medium-term perspec-
tive is promising, though far from widespread to date.
While the Bank makes every effort to be ﬂexible in its
communications, an inherent tension remains
between the short-term perspective of the media and
the ﬁnancial markets and the longer-term objective of
monetary policy. The Bank’s continuing communication
challenge is to keep emphasizing the medium-term
horizon of 18 to 24 months since, for the media, market
watchers, and market participants, a week or a month
may be a very long time.
Enhanced Transparency, Accountability,
and Dialogue with the Public
The fourth objective concerned the communication of
monetary policy. The growing role of communication
in monetary policy since the adoption of inﬂation tar-
gets in 1991 reﬂects a fundamental change in the way
that monetary policy is approached and conducted.
This change is based on the recognition that transpar-
ency and more open communication can help to
explain to Canadians why and how the Bank makes
its decisions, making monetary policy more under-
standable to the public, and hence more credible.
One method for improving the conduct of Canadian
monetary policy has been to increase transparency in
Bank communication, by providing the public with
more frequent and regular accounts of the Bank’s8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
views on the Canadian economy. The move to the
ﬁxed announcement dates has indeed created new
occasions to communicate by enabling the Bank’s
communication strategy to be built on a year-round
program of planned events.
This has helped in a number of ways.
Regular and consistent communication helps to put
the Bank and ﬁnancial markets on the same wave-
length with respect to the broad direction of monetary
policy. If the Bank does a good job of communicating
its outlook and the key risks in the period ahead, there
tends to be less volatility in ﬁnancial markets and a
smoother, more rapid incorporation of any shifts in
policy into interest rates and exchange rates (Jenkins
2001). Parent (2002–2003) found some empirical evi-
dence that ﬁxed announcement dates have improved
the predictability of Bank of Canada decisions. Before
the adoption of ﬁxed dates, changes in the target for
the overnight rate had a signiﬁcant impact on BAX
and on two-year interest rates, indicating that mone-
tary policy decisions represented a surprise in terms
of timing and also a change in longer-term expecta-
tions for monetary policy. The opposite result was evi-
dent after the implementation of the new system,
signaling that market participants’ ability to predict
monetary policy measures had improved and indicat-
ing that the higher level of transparency helps the
Bank and ﬁnancial markets to share a common view
with respect to the general direction of interest rates.
While the Bank ﬁrmly believes that monetary policy
works better when everyone understands its broad
thrust, this does not mean that market views will
always coincide with those of the Bank. For example,
the Bank’s decision to hold interest rates unchanged
on 4 September 2002 seemed to catch market watchers
by surprise, leading to some confusion as to what
transparency actually meant. For some commentators,
it appeared to mean “conditioning,” or ﬁne-tuning
markets, which the Bank has been careful to say it
does not do.
As Governor Dodge said in a speech delivered in Win-
nipeg in January 2002, “With our press releases, peri-
odic reports, and speeches, we try to explain our
thinking. In doing so, we hope to help Canadians,
including those in the ﬁnancial markets, anticipate the
generaldirectionofmonetarypolicy.”DeputyGovernor
Sheryl Kennedy, speaking to the Financial Markets
Association of Canada in November 2002, elaborated
on this point, “We do not try to ﬁne-tune market
expectations about our interest rate decisions just
before we take them.We cannot send a signal in
advance, because we just don’t know ahead of time
what the decision will be.”7 In August 2003, Ms.
Kennedy told a group of economists that, “It’s up to
others, including markets, to form their own views
about the precise future path of interest rates. We do not
try to ﬁne-tune market expectations or to provide
guidance as to what our near-term interest rate deci-
sions will be for any speciﬁc announcements”
(Kennedy 2002, 2003).
Despite some confusion over what constitutes trans-
parency, the ﬁxed-date process, with its regular and
consistent communications, has worked to improve
public understanding of what the Bank is trying to do,
thereby increasing the chances of achieving the inﬂa-
tion target with as little economic disruption as possi-
ble. If market participants and members of the public
believe that action will be taken to ensure that inﬂa-
tion remains close to the 2 per cent target, they are
more likely to make economic decisions based on that
expectation. The net effect is a more stable macro-
economic environment.
A consistent communication process also reinforces
the Bank’s accountability and hence its credibility. As
a public institution with a high degree of autonomy
for the conduct of monetary policy, the Bank has an
obligation to let Canadians know how well it is doing
its job. A speciﬁc agreed-upon inﬂation target pro-
vides a clear basis for measuring performance. Full
accountabilityrequiresthattheBankprovidethepublic
with the information it needs to understand its policy
objectives, the factors it takes into account in making
decisions, and its progress in meeting the objectives.
Fixed announcement dates have given the Bank a reg-
ular opportunity to bring Canadians up to date on its
views about the economy. On every ﬁxed announce-
ment date, the Bank issues a press release explaining
its decision. These releases work with the Monetary
Policy Report (MPR), the Updates to the MPR, and
speeches by senior bank ofﬁcials in which the Bank
presents its analysis and explains its actions to help
Canadians, including those in ﬁnancial markets, antic-
ipate the general direction of monetary policy.
7.  As discussed in Macklem (2002), the Governing Council receives most of
the information relevant to the medium-term outlook for the economy and
inﬂation in the two weeks preceding each announcement date. Policy deci-
sions are based on this analysis, which only comes together just before the
announcement is made. Given this decision-making process, it is not possible
to condition market expectations in advance.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
In the process of making the messages more transpar-
ent, the medium itself has also changed. Since ﬁxed
dates were introduced, the press releases have evolved,
becoming more focused and generally shorter, provid-
ing a brief explanation for the interest rate decision.
For a more complete analysis, the public is typically
referred to the MPR and the MPR Update. The interval
between the announcement and publication of the
MPR has also been shortened, to ensure the timeliness
of the communication of the analysis.
The ﬁxed announcement dates have
provided the basis for more regular
commentary by analysts and the
media, and for expanded public
outreach.
In addition to enhancing transparency and helping
the public to better understand the Bank’s actions, the
ﬁxed announcement dates and documents related to
them have provided the basis for more regular com-
mentary by analysts and the media, and for expanded
public outreach. They have also helped to bring about
something of a two-way dialogue with key audiences
and commentators. For example, in September 2003,
the C.D. Howe Institute established a Monetary Policy
Council. Made up of 12 of Canada’s most prominent
monetary and ﬁnancial market economists, the Coun-
cil’s goal is to provide the Bank of Canada, ﬁnancial
market participants, and economic analysts with an
independent assessment of the appropriate stance of
Canadian monetary policy. To this end, it issues a bul-
letin shortly before each ﬁxed date, announcing each
Council member’s view of the target for the overnight
rate along with a summary council judgment of the
individual votes.
Since the Bank did not conduct a systematic media
analysis before ﬁxed announcement dates were
adopted, it is not possible to do an exact before-and-
after comparison of media coverage. Over the last two
years, however, coverage has more than doubled in
some instances. There has also been more in-depth
media analysis of the reasons behind the decision-
making process, reﬂecting a better understanding of
the Bank’s thinking on monetary policy. A brief sam-
pling of media reaction demonstrates how the
approach is working.
“For most of the past decade, the Bank has been striv-
ing for greater transparency in its operations. When
financial markets understand how the Bank is thinking
and how it views the unfolding drama of economic
activity, so the reasoning goes, they will operate more
smoothly and intelligently. If that’s the goal, the Bank
may have reached transparency nirvana” (Little 2002).
In the Financial Post on 18 March 2002, Jacqueline
Thorpe wrote, “Mr. Dodge has embraced the ‘trans-
parency’ craze that has swept the world’s central
banks. . . . (he) became the ﬁrst central bank governor
to admit that interest rates might have to go up by
summer as the economy rebounds from its slump”
(Thorpe 2002).
Such transparency has not come without costs. Mar-
kets and the media now pay close attention to every
word in the Bank’s statements, sometimes resulting in
confusion. For example, in June 2002, the press release
did not mention “upside and downside risks,” while
the July press release and the MPR Update did. This
led some analysts to wonder whether there was a
message that the Bank was trying to convey by this.
Similarly, in its announcement of the April 2003 decision
to raise its policy rate, the Bank dropped the phrase
“further reduction in monetary stimulus will be neces-
sary,” reducing the emphasis on the need for further
tightening in the near term. When the phrase reap-
peared in the MPR a week later, the added qualiﬁer
“over time” went largely unnoticed, leading to further
confusion among observers as to what the Bank was
telling them. From examples such as these, it is proba-
bly safe to conclude that, while the media and markets
are better informed and more aware of the Bank’s
monetary policy framework, there are also the risks of
occasional confusion about the Bank’s key messages.
In general, however, it seems that the ﬁxed-date
approach has helped the Bank to increase public
understanding of its thinking and its views.
Despitebestefforts,transparencyand
clarity will continue to pose
challenges for the Bank and, indeed,
for all central banks.10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2003
Of course, despite best efforts, transparency and clar-
ity will continue to pose challenges for the Bank and,
indeed, for all central banks. The Bank will continue to
work to ensure that all stakeholders share a clear and
common understanding of its language and concepts.
This means repeating the length of the timeframe (the
medium-term perspective of 18 to 24 months), the for-
ward-looking orientation of monetary policy, and the
conditional nature of its statements (Vayid 2002).
Ancillary Beneﬁts
The ﬁxed-date approach has also brought improve-
ments to internal Bank of Canada processes support-
ing monetary policy decision-making and com-
munication.8 It has improved the development and
presentation of all the information and analysis perti-
nent to the decision-making process. Before the intro-
duction of ﬁxed announcement dates, staff prepared
quarterly projections, as well as risk and alternative
policy scenarios following the release of the National
Accounts data by Statistics Canada. In addition,
roughly midway between the complete projections,
staff provided an assessment of the near-term outlook,
based on data received over the intervening period,
and assessed the implications for the stance of mone-
tary policy. However, because monetary policy deci-
sions could be made on any business day, the timing
of the policy rate decision was largely inﬂuenced by
tactical considerations and the decision did not
always beneﬁt from a detailed economic analysis.
Fixed announcement dates have eliminated these
8.   See Macklem (2002) for a description of the decision-making process.
gaps by enabling a more systematic, timely, and
broader set of analytic perspectives through the major
brieﬁngs, the risk analyses, and policy scenarios and
through the ﬁnal brieﬁng and recommendations meet-
ing that take place in the two weeks leading to the
decision date. Similarly, the regular schedule of meet-
ings has served to further integrate communications
with the monetary policy process. The knowledge that
communications will occur on certain days has
encouraged more focused effort towards developing
the Bank’s messages.
Conclusion
The Bank’s efforts to explain the background of its
decisions are part of an ongoing process of improve-
ment in the conduct and delivery of monetary policy.
The system of ﬁxed announcement dates plays a vital
and strategic role in helping the Bank progress
towards this goal. Empirical evidence conﬁrms that
ﬁxedannouncementdatesprovideimportantbeneﬁts.
First, by reducing uncertainty for the public and ﬁnan-
cial markets as to the timing of announcements, ﬁxed
announcement dates allow them to plan more efﬁ-
ciently and to integrate changes more smoothly. Second,
ﬁxed announcement dates emphasize that economic
conditions in Canada are the primary focus of Cana-
dian monetary policy.
The new system also provides the Bank with a regular
opportunity to position recent economic and ﬁnancial
developments in a medium-term perspective. Finally,
the ﬁxed dates have improved the overall effective-
ness of monetary policy in Canada through greater
transparency.
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